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I. INTRODUCTION
Floating on Colorado streams ranks as a popular sport with
individuals and groups who use various watercraft ranging from kayaks
to large pneumatic rafts. This activity utilizes streams flowing through
both public and private land, despite a Colorado Supreme Court
decision holding the public has no right to use waters overlying private
lands for recreational purposes without the landowner's consent.
Some proponents of a right to float through private land contend a
statute defining "premises" for purposes of criminal trespass, or even
an Attorney General's Opinion interpreting it, created an affirmative
right to float so long as the floater does not touch the bottom or
banks. Others insist that a right to float exists under federal law. Still
others believe they should have the right to float any stream that can
tJohn R. Hifl,Jr., is Of Counsel with the firm Bratton & McClow, L.L.C., in Gunnison,
Colorado. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1958, received
his M.S. in Civil Engineering from Stanford University in 1963, and received his J.D.
from George Washington University in 1978. Before entering private practice in 1992,
Mr. Hill was a trial attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice, Environmental and
Natural Resources Division. He has also served as Assistant Director of Civil Works,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Daniel S. Young, a third-year
law student at the University of Denver College of Law, who researched the law on
navigability and greatly assisted in reviewing and revising this article.
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be floated.
As floating has spread progressively from large rivers like the
Colorado and Arkansas to smaller tributaries, it has caused conflicts
among the floaters, riparian landowners, and wading anglers.
Conflicts are likely to increase as demand for floating experiences
increases and shallow-draft watercraft lead to floating even smaller
streams. Where the smaller streams run through private land, floating
is more intrusive. Many landowners have built homes near the stream
because they enjoy being near the water. Some ranchers on smaller
streams with good fisheries often generate a significant portion of
their income from exclusive fishing easements. Floating these smaller
streams conflicts with angling, threatening this source of income.
Landowners also value their solitude and find their privacy invaded by
the rafters. Historically, ranchers have had to fence across streams to
manage livestock. Now they are finding their cattle fences and water
diversion structures regarded as unlawful obstacles. Law enforcement
officials in one county have threatened a rancher with arrest and
prosecution for obstructing a waterway "to which the public has
access," if he fences across the stream running through his ranch.
Many otherwise well-informed people, including some landowners
and law enforcement officials, take for granted a right to float through
private property. The expansion of floating from larger streams
flowing through long reaches of public land to smaller streams with
long reaches flowing through private land makes it imperative that the
public be informed about Colorado law regarding floating. To that
end, this article examines the Colorado Constitution, statutes, court
decisions, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the concept of navigability to
demonstrate that no affirmative right to float through private property
exists in Colorado.
II. THE COLORADO CONSTITUTION
In People v. Emmert, the Colorado Supreme Court held Article XVI,
section 5 of the Colorado Constitution does not give the public the
right to use streams flowing through private land without the owner's
consent.'
Emmert and others were arrested, charged with and
convicted of criminal trespass while "tubing" on the Colorado River in
Grand County. The facts were not in dispute. Emmert and the other
defendants had floated and fished from rafts over private property on
the Colorado River and had touched the riverbed as they crossed that
property. At the landowner's request, the sheriff arrested Emmert and
the other defendants. The defendants were convicted of violating a
trespass statute that provided: "[a] person commits the crime of third
degree criminal trespass if he unlawfully enters or remains in or upon
premises. "' Emmert appealed his conviction to the Colorado Supreme

1. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027-28, 1030 (Colo. 1979).
2. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-504(1) (1973) (amended 1993); Emmert, 597 P.2d at
1026.
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Court. The court noted the general rule of property law in Colorado
states that land underlying non-navigable streams is the subject of
private ownership and is vested in the proprietors of the adjoining
lands.3 The parties had stipulated that the Colorado River was not
navigable and had not been used for any kind of trade or commerce.
The defendants did not challenge the adjacent landowner's ownership
of the riverbed.4
At the time of the defendants' arrest and conviction, the state had
no statutory definition of "premises." The court applied an ancient
common law rule "cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum," which means
that the person who owns the surface controls everything above it.5
Accordingly, the court concluded ownership of the stream beds
included ownership of the space above those beds. Therefore, one
who intruded upon that space without the permission of the owner,
whether it be for fishing or for other recreational purposes such as
floating, committed a trespass.6 The court applied this rule, stating
"the ownership of the bed of a non-navigable stream vests in the owner
the exclusive right of control of everything above the stream bed,
subject only to constitutional and statutory limitations, restrictions and
regulations."'
Emmert raised the defense that Article XVI, section 5 of the
Colorado Constitution8 establishes a public right to recreational use of
all waters in the state. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed,
stating, as it had earlier in Hartman v. Tresise,9 that the constitutional
provision applied to appropriation of water for beneficial use." In
other words, Article XVI, section 5 applies only to the right to make
appropriations and not to the use of the state's water for recreation or
fishing. Thus, People v. Emmert clearly enunciated the right of a
riparian landowner to exclude the public from the surface and bed of
streams overlying his land.

3. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027 (citing More v. Johnson, 568 P.2d 437, 439 (Colo.
1977); Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 687 (Colo. 1905); Hanlon v. Hobson, 51 P. 433,
435 (Colo. 1897)).
4. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1026.
5. Id. at 1027. The court also noted the General Assembly had recognized the
same rule in 1937 by enacting section 41-1-107 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which
provides: "[t ] he ownership of space above the lands and waters of this state is declared
to be vested in the several owners of the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight
of aircraft." Id.; see COLO. REv. STAT. § 41-1-107 (2000).
6. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159
(1965)).
7. Id. at 1027.
8. This section provides: "[t]he water of every natural stream, not heretofore
appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of
the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to
appropriation as hereinafter provided." COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
9. Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686 (Colo. 1905).
10. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028.
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M. STATUTES
A. COLORADO REVISED STATUTES SECTION 18-4-504.5

Colorado has no statute expressly authorizing public use of any
stream flowing through private property. On the contrary, the
Colorado Supreme Court in Emmert applied the common law "ad
coelum" rule and its statutory equivalent in concluding the owner of the
bed of a non-navigable river has the exclusive right of control of
everything above the bed "subject only to constitutional and statutory
limitations, restrictions and regulations.""
In 1977, after Emmert's conviction of criminal trespass and while
his appeal pended, the General Assembly passed Colorado Revised
Statutes section 18-4-504.5, defining "premises" for purposes of
criminal trespass as follows: "[a]s used in sections 18-4-503 and 18-4504, 'premises' means real property, buildings, and other
improvements thereon, and the stream banks and beds of any
nonnavigable
fresh water streams flowing through such real
property. " "
In 1983, the Executive Director of the Department of Natural
Resources asked then Attorney General Duane Woodard for his formal
4
legal opinion on two related questions (the "Woodard Opinion").1
The first question asked whether section 18-4-504.5 exposed floaters to
criminal trespass liability if they floated through private property and
did not touch the bed or banks. The second question asked whether
section 18-4-504.5 "authorize[s] adjoining landowners to prohibit or
otherwise control such floating or boating." 5 Woodard answered both
questions in the negative.
In answering the first question, Woodard examined legislative
history. '" He concluded the General Assembly, by defining "premises"
in a manner inconsistent with the "ad coelum" doctrine, effectively
repealed, for purposes of the criminal trespass statute, the common
law rule the Colorado Supreme Court applied in affirming Emmert's
conviction. Woodard then concluded it was not a criminal trespass to
float through private property so long as the floater does not touch the
bed or banks. Throughout his analysis, Woodard was careful to limit
the applicability of section 18-4-504.5 to criminal trespass. 8
Unfortunately, Woodard's answer to the second question was
ambiguous. Woodard stated that "[b]ecause section 18-4-504.5 speaks

11. M at 1027.
12. See discussion infra Part V.
13. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 184-504.5 (2000).
14. Purpose and effect of C.R.S. 1973, 18-4-504.5 (1978 repl. vol. 8), Colo.Op. Att'y
Gen. No. ONR8303042/KW 1 (Aug. 31, 1983) (hereinafter Woodard Opinion].
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 4-6.
18. Id. at 1-8.
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to criminal trespass and does not address civil remedies, it cannot be
viewed as authorizing the owners of stream banks and beds to prohibit
or otherwise control the use for floating of waters passing over their
lands." 9 This language is susceptible of several interpretations, the
most logical being that the landowner has no authority to charge the
floater with criminal trespass, but still has civil remedies available.
Alternatively, the statement is a non sequitur. The first part of the
sentence about civil remedies is a correct statement. However, if
Woodard intended to say that the legislature has to authorize property
owners to exclude others from their property, then the opinion is
wrong. The right to exclude others is inherent in the ownership of
property. 20 "The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right
to exclude others. That is 'one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'" 2 The
legislature does not have to grant the right to exclude others and
cannot take that right away without constitutional consequences.22
Attorney General Woodard would have been correct had he simply
stated that, because section 18-4-504.5 does not address civil remedies,
those remedies remain unaffected.
Additionally, those who rely on the Woodard Opinion as authority
for an affirmative right to float ignore the fact that the issue was not
presented to Woodard. Since the opinion contains no discussion on
whether an affirmative right to float exists, it cannot be relied upon as
a basis for an affirmative right to float.
The unfortunate consequence of Woodard's response to the
second question is that landowners and floaters alike have been misled
into believing that riparian landowners are powerless to confrol or
stop floating through their property. Some even regard the Woodard
Opinion as if it were the equivalent of a court decision or statute. On
the contrary, an attorney general's opinion is given only "respectful
consideration" and a court addressing the issue must make its own
independent analysis. 3 Woodard's answer to the second question
cannot withstand even the most superficial analysis.
In Emmert, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that one who
intrudes upon the space above the surface of the land without the
permission of the owner commits a trespass.24 The same conduct can

19. Id. at 7.
20. College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 673 (1999).
21. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
22. Justice Carrigan, in his dissenting opinion in Emmert, notes that the majority has
"painted the state into a corner" by creating a vested property right in stream water.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Colo. 1979) (Carrigan, J., dissenting). The
consequence is that the General Assembly "cannot give the public recreational access
to rivers without taking away from landowners their newly recognized property
interests and paying them 'just compensation.'" Id.
23. Colonial Bank v. Colo. Fin. Servs. Bd., 961 P.2d 579, 584 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
24. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 159
(1965)).
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be both a crime and a tort." Therefore, the civil remedies available to
the landowner would be those available for a civil trespass: (1)
damages," and (2) injunction where the trespass is continuing or the
threat of continuing trespass exists.
The Colorado Supreme Court's trespass analysis in Emmert has
been criticized for its reliance on the "ad coelum" doctrine. 28 The basis
of the criticism stems from the United States Supreme Court's
statement in United States v. Causby that the "ad coelum" doctrine has
no place in the modem world."" However, in the very
same opinion,
the Supreme Court stated "it is obvious that if the landowner is to have
full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the
immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere."" The Supreme
Court held that "[t]he landowner owns at least as much of the space
above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the
land.""' Thus, the Supreme Court may have drastically reduced the
reach of the "ad coelum" doctrine, but it did reaffirm the landowner's
ownership of all airspace above the land that the landowner can use in
connection with his land. Therefore, Causby supports rather than
undercuts the Colorado Supreme Court's trespass analysis in Emmert.
In addition to the fact that section 18-4-504.5 does not speak to
civil remedies as Woodard correctly noted, the normal rules of
statutory construction militate against reading that section to deprive a
riparian landowner of the civil remedies for trespass in existence at the
time of the Emmert decision. First, the application of the definition of
premises in section 184504.5 is, by its terms, limited to "sections 18-4503 and 18-4-504," second and third degree criminal trespass,
respectively."2 Because the statute is clearly on its face limited in scope
to criminal trespass, resorting to other rules of statutory construction is
inappropriate.3 Second, even if section 18-4-504.5 is not clear on its
face, it must not be presumed to alter the common law unless it does
so expressly or by necessary implication. 4 Third, Colorado Revised
Statutes section 41-1-107, which the Emmert court held was the basis of
a riparian landowner's exclusive right to control everything above the
3
stream bed, is still included in the StatutesY.
If section 18-4-504.5 is an
abrogation of civil remedies rather than a decriminalization of

25.

21 AM.JUR. 2D CriminalLaw § 21 (1998).
26. Van Wyk v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 996 P.2d 193, 197 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999),
cert. granted, (Apr.10, 2000).
27. Cobai v. Young, 679 P.2d 121,124 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
28. See, e.g., Richard Gast, Note, People v. Emmert: A Step Backward for Recreational
Water Use in Colorado,52 U. COLO. L. REv. 247, 250 (1981).
29. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946); see also Gast, supranote 28.
30. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
31. Id.
32. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-4-503 to -504.5 (2000).
33. SeeJones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218, 221 (Colo. 1992).
34. City of Colo. Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1055 (Colo. 1998).
35. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 41-1-107 (2000); People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027
(Colo. 1979).
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floating, then it must have repealed by implication Colorado Revised
Statutes section 41-1-107. "[A]n intent to repeal by implication to be
36
effective must appear clearly, manifestly, and with cogent force." No
such intent is apparent. Fourth, courts will "infer no abrogation of a
"
common law right of action absent clear legislative intent. "
Therefore, a court is unlikely to interpret section 18-4-504.5 as a
deprivation of a riparian landowner's right to bring a civil action for
trespass.
Furthermore, the court in Emmert acknowledged the State had
passed section 18-4-504.5 and, in the very next sentence, held, "the
public has no right to the use of waters overlying private lands for
3
recreational purposes without the consent of the owner." 1 Section 184-504.5 was not an issue in deciding Emmert's appeal because it was
passed after his conviction. Had the court believed section 18-4-504.5
abrogated the landowner's civil remedies for trespass, or created an
affirmative right, it is unlikely the court would have stated its holding
so unequivocally.
If section 18-4-504.5 does abrogate the civil remedy for trespass, it
might be unconstitutional because it denies riparian landowners the
ability to protect their right to exclude floaters in court-a right
confirmed by Emmert. The Equality of Justice provision of the Bill of
Rights in the Colorado Constitution guarantees a right of access to the
courts, stating: " [ c] ourts ofjustice shall be open to every person, and a
speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or
character; and right and justice should be administered without sale,
denial or delay."3 In any event, when the General Assembly abrogates
common law remedies, it must provide a statutory remedy."
If section 18-4-504.5 did grant the public the right to float through
private property after Emmert held there was no such right, then this
4
grant operates as a taking of private property for public use. ' In Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that a
permit issued by the Corps of Engineers, which contained a condition
that made previously private waters open to public use, was a
compensatory taking. 42 Thus, under Kaiser Aetna, if section 18-4-504.5
granted a right to float, this grant constitutes a compensable taking of
private property.
If section 18-4-504.5 authorized the public to float through private
property, then it authorized a permanently recurring physical invasion
36. Prop. Tax Adm'r v. Prod. Geophysical Servs., Inc., 860 P.2d 514, 518 (Colo.
1993).
37. Bayer v. Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc., 960 P.2d 70, 74 (Colo. 1998)
(citations omitted).
38. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029-30.
39. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6.
40. See Finn v. Indus. Comm'n of Colo., 437 P.2d 542, 544 (Colo. 1968)
(abrogation of common law remedies constitutional where substitute statutory remedy
provided); accord Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300, 1306 (Colo. 1982).
41. SeeKaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175-78 (1979).
42. Id. at 180.
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of that property. Courts have long considered physical invasions of
private property authorized or perpetrated by governmental entities to
be takings. The United States Supreme Court considered such an
issue in Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CA TV Corp." Loretto involved a
New York statute that required a building owner to permit a cable
television ("CATV") company to install its CATV facilities on his
property without payment from the company in excess of a reasonable
amount as determined by a state commission.
The Court
characterized the CATV facilities as a minor, but permanent, physical
occupation of the building owner's property. The New York Court of
Appeals had applied a balancing of interests analysis to uphold the
statute because it benefited the community and served a legitimate
police power purpose." The Court reversed, noting "[t]he one
incontestable case for compensation (short of formal expropriation)
seems to occur when the government deliberately brings it about that
its agents, or the public at large, 'regularly' use, or 'permanently'
occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be
under private ownership." 5 In conclusion, the Court reiterated that "a
permanent physical occupation is a government action of such a
unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that
a court might ordinarily examine. " 4 Therefore, if the General
Assembly actually created a right to float by enacting section 18-4504.5, it has potentially exposed the State to liability for payment of
just compensation to private riparian landowners statewide for
opening to public use what Emmert held was private land.
The General Assembly enacted section 18-4-504.5 in reaction to
Emmert. As noted above, the statute is limited to defining "premises"
for the criminal trespass statutes. It contains no express grant of access
to the streams. Defining a crime and creating a public easement are
fundamentally different things. Perhaps the General Assembly heeded
Justice Carrigan's admonition that the Emmert majority had "painted
the state into a corner," making it impossible for the General Assembly
to create a public right to float without compensating riparian
landowners." In any event, the prospect of the State compensating
riparian landowners statewide, coupled with the arguments presented
above, makes the likelihood of a court finding that section 18-4-504.5
creates a public right to float through private property highly
improbable.

43.

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).

44. Id. at 423-26.
45. Id. at 427 n.5 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 432; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)
(placing physical invasions in the category of regulatory action, which requires just
compensation without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced by the
regulation).
47. See supranote 22.
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B. OTHER STATUTES
In Emmert, the Colorado Supreme Court found several statutes
implicitly recognized a riparian landowner's right to exclude the
public from streams running through his or her land: (1) Colorado
Revised Statutes section 33-1-112(g) (1973)48 (giving the wildlife
commission the power to enter into agreements with landowners for
public hunting and fishing areas); (2) Colorado Revised Statutes
section 33-41-101 (1973) (stating that Article 41 of Title 33, which
limits the liability of landowners who make land and water areas
available for recreational purposes, is an implicit recognition of the
landowner's right to close to public access the streams running over
his land); and (3) Colorado Revised Statutes section 33-6-123(1)
(1973)'9 (making it a misdemeanor to enter onto private land to hunt
or fish without permission) &
Some floating interests believe Colorado Revised Statutes section
18-9-107 implies the right to float because it makes it a crime to
obstruct a waterway. This statute provides:
[a]n individual or corporation commits an offense if without legal
privilege such individual or corporation intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly... [o]bstructs a highway, street, sidewalk, railway,
waterway, building entrance, elevator, aisle, stairway, or hallway to
which the public or a substantial group of the public has access or any
other place5 1 used
conveyances.

for the

passage

of persons,

vehicles,

or

On its face, the statute does not create any rights; it simply declares
illegal the obstruction of any waterway "to which the public.., has
access."52 There are obviously reaches of waterways flowing through
public land, such as the Colorado and Arkansas Rivers, to which the
public does have access. That fact, alone, provides ample reason for
the legislature to have included waterways in the above statute.
However, as this article demonstrates, no basis in Colorado law exists
for the public to have access to any waterway other than those
waterways flowing through public land. Therefore, the General
Assembly had no legal basis to make the obstruction of a private
waterway a crime, thereby making a rancher a criminal for fencing
across a stream to keep cattle from straying off his or her land.
Indeed, some law enforcement authorities have threatened
Codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 33-1-105(1) (g) (2000).
49. Codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 33-6-116 (2000).
50. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Colo.1979).
51. COLO. Rzv. STAT. § 18-9-107(1)(a) (2000).
52. Id.
53. In addition, the General Assembly had no legal basis to make the rancher's
neighbor a criminal for building a fence to keep the rancher's cattle from entering his
or her land by way of the stream, as the law requires maintaining a fence in order for
the neighbor to recover damages caused by livestock straying onto the neighbor's
land. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 35-46-101(1),-102 (2000).
48.
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landowners with arrest and prosecution if they build fences across
streams flowing through their land that obstruct the passage of
floaters. This threat is probably idle because securing a conviction
would depend upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the public
has access to the specific reach of the specific stream involved and that
the landowner is not privileged to block access.
Colorado Revised Statutes section 30-30-102, passed in 1974, gives
the board of county commissioners a right of access to any natural
stream to remove obstacles for flood control purposes only, and then
under very limited and specified circumstances.Y This statute clearly
contemplates that the streams are private. Thus, while a variety of
implications may exist in the statutes discussed above, one cannot
reasonably read any of these statutes as granting a right in the public
to float through private property.
IV. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The Public Trust Doctrine declares that the state holds navigable
waters and the lands underneath them in trust for the people of the
state.5 This doctrine is rooted in ancient Roman law and evolved
under English common law into the concept of the public trust.5 6 The
original purpose of the doctrine was to preserve naviable waters for
the public for navigation, commerce, and fishing.
In National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
extended the doctrine to protect recreational and ecological values by
limiting diversions from non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters.
Of most interest to Colorado, however, is the California Supreme
Court's holding that water rights previously granted can be challenged
and reevaluated because of the Public Trust Doctrine. 9
Proponents of public access for floating and wading often cite
Montana's stream access law6 as an example Colorado should emulate.
In 1985, the Montana Legislature enacted its stream access law, which
provides that "all surface waters that are capable of recreational use
may be so used by the public without regard to the ownership of the
land underlying the waters. "6 The basis of the legislation was the
Public Trust Doctrine, as discussed in Montana Coalition for Stream
Access, Inc. v. Curran. In that case, the Montana Supreme Court
found no taking occurred because, under the Public Trust Doctrine
54. COLO. REv. STAT. § 30-30-102 (2000).
55. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
56. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983).
57. Id. at 719.
58. Id. at 719, 721.
59. Id. at 730; see Stephen H. Leonhardt & Brent A. Waite, The Public Trust Doctrine:
What It Is, Where It Came From, and Why ColoradoDoesn't (and Shouldn't) Have One, COLO.
WATER RESOURCES RES. INST., INFO. SERIES No. 78, 190, 205-07 (1995).
60. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to -322 (1999).
61. Id. § 23-2-302(1).
62. Mont. Coalition For Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 167-68 (Mont.
1984).
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and state constitution, any surface waters capable of use for
recreational purposes are available to the public for those purposes,
irrespective of streambed ownership."
64
Colorado has never applied the Public Trust Doctrine to water.
Consequently, there is no basis in Colorado for a stream access law to
ignore bed ownership and taking issues. As popular as the Public
Trust Doctrine may be with environmentalists, its application to water
use in Colorado is unlikely because of the potential adverse impact on
existing water rights under the prior appropriation system. 65
Recognition of the Public Trust Doctrine would place owners and
users of water at risk because a public trust would undermine the
priority system by subjecting existing rights to curtailment or
revocation. 6 Furthermore, in Emmert, the Colorado Supreme Court
declined to apply the Public Trust Doctrine as a basis for a right to
float.61 One Colorado lawyer, in an article lamenting the lack of
environmental protection provisions in Colorado water law, titled the
public trust as "The Two Little Words That Can't Be Spoken."6
In 1994, 1995, and 1996, advocates of the Public Trust Doctrine
proposed a ballot initiative to amend Article XVI, section 5, of the
Colorado Constitution 69 to adopt the Public Trust Doctrine. 0 Each
time the initiative failed to qualify. The climate for the Public Trust
Doctrine in Colorado is hostile, and likely to remain so, because it is
widely perceived as antithetical to the doctrine of prior appropriation.
Moreover, retroactive application or adoption of the Public Trust
Doctrine for water could itself raise the specter of takings problems.71
V. THE CONCEPT OF NAVIGABILITY
In any question of navigability, the preliminary step is to determine
whether to apply federal or state law. Federal law is used to determine
whether the federal government can regulate the waterway, whether
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction applies, and of most interest here,
to determine title to the stream bed. The term "navigable" has
different meanings for different purposes. As the Supreme Court has

63. Id. at 171.
64. See Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d
1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995) (Mullarkey, J., dissenting) (Colorado Supreme Court has
never recognized the public trust doctrine with respect to water).
65. See generally GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in
Water Quality Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 841, 855-56 (1989) (criticizing attempts to use
the Public Trust Doctrine to reduce existing water rights).
66. See Leonhardt & Waite, supra note 59, at 212-13.
67. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979).
68. Lori Potter, The 1969 Act and EnvironmentalProtection, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv.
70, 77 (1999).
69. Seesupranote8.
70. In re Proposed Initiative "1996-6," 917 P.2d 1277, 1278-79 (Colo. 1996); In re
Proposed Initiative "Public Rights In Waters II," 898 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Colo. 1995); In
re Proposed Initiative on Water Rights, 877 P.2d 321, 324 (Colo. 1994).
71. See Leonhardt & Waite, supra note 59, at 210-11.
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noted, "any reliance upon judicial precedent must be predicated upon
careful appraisal of the purpose for which the concept of 'navigability'
was invoked in a particular case." n
For purposes of public use of waters, states may adopt different
and less stringent tests of navigability." Some states define navigability
for public use based on the state constitution or statutory law.74 Some
states recognize a right to float if the stream accommodates
recreational watercraft, that is "whatever floats your boat."75 Colorado,
however, has not adopted a definition of navigability for any purpose.
To the contrary, the Colorado Supreme Court long ago stated "[t]he
natural streams of the state are nonnavigable within its limits.""
Therefore, if a right to float through private property exists in
Colorado based on the concept of navigability, it must rest on federal
law.
A. FEDERAL LAW-NAVIGABILITY IN FACT

Uses of the term "navigable" in federal law can be confusing.
"Navigable" in the federal sense dictates whether the federal
government can regulate a waterway under the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution," the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act of 1899,78 the Clean Water Act,9 or the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the federal courts."0
Federal uses of the term
"navigable" are best understood by considering the concept of
"navigability in fact" as originally defined by the United States
Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball."'
The issue in The Daniel Ball was whether the Grand River in
Michigan was navigable water within the meaning of the acts of
Congress regulating navigation.82 The Supreme Court disposed of the
English common law notion that only those waters subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide are navigable waters. After noting there are rivers
in the United States navigable for hundreds of miles above the
72. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171 (1979) (citation omitted).
73. Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 127 Cal. Rptr. 830, 834
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (citing Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651, 655
(1927)).
74. See, e.g., S. Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295,
1297-98 (Idaho 1974) (under Idaho statute, streams which will float logs over six
inches in diameter, or are capable of being navigated by oar or motor propelled small
craft are navigable); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145 (Wyo. 1961) (under
Wyoming's Constitution, title to all waters is in the state, and the state has an easement
for public right-of-way through natural channels).
75. See, e.g., Chris A. Shafer, Public Rights in Michigan's Streams: Toward a Modern
Definition of Navigability, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 9, 41 (1999).
76. In reGerman Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo. 1913).
77. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, ci. 3.
78. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (1994).
79. Id. at §§ 1251-1387.
80. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
81. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
82. Id. at 558-59.
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influence of the tide, the Court held:
[t]hose rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they
are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are
or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water.

Thus, The Daniel Ball proscribes the test for navigability in fact for
public use. Courts apply The Daniel Ball test as the basic test of
navigability.'
B. NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES

In defining "navigable waters of the United States," The DanielBall
Court stated:
[t]hey constitute navigable waters of the United States within the
meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the
navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary
condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued
highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other
States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such
commerce is conducted by water.85
Thus, interstate or international use or susceptibility of such use makes

a waterbody that is navigable in fact a "navigable water of the United
States."
Over time, the Supreme Court has expanded and clarified the
definition of "navigable waters of the United States" to include streams
which have been used in the past but are no longer used,86 or which
are susceptible of use, with improvements, to transport interstate or
foreign commerce. Thus, "navigable waters of the United States" is a
term of art defining the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts,
jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors

Act of 1899,8 and jurisdiction under other acts of Congress using the
term.
Although courts make conclusive determinations of
navigability, 9 the Corps of Engineers' administrative definition of
"navigable waters of the United States" reads as follows:
Navigable waters of the United States are those waters that are subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have
been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 563.
SeeUnited States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 406 (1940).
The Daniel Ball 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563.
Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 123-24 (1921).
AppalachianElec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 407-08.
33 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (1994).
33 C.F.R. § 329.3 (2000).
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interstate or foreign commerce. A determination of navigability,
once made, applies laterally over the entire surface of the waterbody,
and is not extinguished bo later actions or events which impede or
destroy navigable capacity.
The Corps of Engineers classifies the Colorado River downstream of
Grand Junction, and the Navajo Reservoir, as a "navigable water[s] of
the United States."9 These classifications appear to be administrative
determinations as no court decisions to date so hold. No other
"navigable waters of the United States" exist in Colorado."
C. THE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE
"Navigable waters of the United States" are normally subject to the
navigation servitude.93
The navigation servitude is a dominant
servitude pursuant to which the United States may alter the stream or
do other things that would ordinarily be an invasion of private
property rights without payment ofjust compensation. 4 The Supreme
Court explained:
The dominant power of the federal Government, as has been
repeatedly held, extends to the entire bed of a stream, which includes
the lands below ordinary high-water mark. The exercise of the power
within these limits is not an invasion of any private property right in
such lands for which the United States must make compensation. The
damage sustained results not from a taking of the riparian owner's
property in the stream bed, but from the lawful exercise of a power to
which that property has always been subject.
The navigational
servitude expresses the notion that the
determination "whether a taking has occurred must take into
consideration the important public interest in the flow of interstate
waters that in their natural condition are in fact capable of supporting
public navigation. " 6 However, where private interests have made a
waterbody navigable for interstate commerce at considerable cost, the
federal government may not require that the waterbody be open to the
public without payment ofjust compensation.97
The term "navigation servitude" often is used incorrectly, as if it
were synonymous with a public right of access. Streams subject to the
90. Id. § 329.4.
91. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Sacramento Dist., Waterways within Sacramento

District

Regulatory

Boundaries,

http://www.spk.usace.army.mil/cespk-

co/regulatory/navigable.html.
92. Telephone Interview with Anita Culp, Albuquerque District, U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs (Jan. 8, 2001).
93. Se generally Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979).
94. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967).

95. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592,
596-97 (1941).
96. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
97. Id. at 179-80.
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navigation servitude, that is "navigable waters of the United States," are
open for public use, unless they fall within the Kaiser Aetna type of
exception discussed in the preceding paragraph. 9 The converse,
however, does not necessarily follow. There are streams that may be
open for public use under state law" or intrastate waters navigable for
title purposes that are not "navigable waters of the United States"
because they are not used or susceptible of use in interstate
commerce."' Without the interstate commerce component, there is
no navigation servitude.' In any event, the navigation servitude is of
very limited applicability in Colorado because the only "navigable
waters of the United States" in Colorado are the Colorado River
downstream of Grand Junction and the Navajo Reservoir.
D. NAVIGABLE WATERS

In contrast to "navigable waters of the United States," the Clean
Water Act defines the term "navigable waters" as "the waters of the
United States."'0 2 Courts have construed "navigable waters" ve7y
broadly, holding intermittent streams to be "navigable waters.
However, a very recent Supreme Court decision may signal a retreat
from this broad interpretation. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Supreme Court found the
Corps of Engineers' regulations defining "navigable waters" as applied
to some isolated ponds used by migratory waterfowl exceeded the
authority granted to the Corps under section 404(a) of the Clean
Water Act. 1 4 The regulation defined "waters of the United States" to
include a long list of intrastate waters "the use, degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce. " "'
The Court found "nothing approaching a clear statement from
Congress that it intended § 404(a) to reach an abandoned°6 sand and
gravel pit," even though it was used by migratory waterfowl.'
The Corps' definition of "waters of the United States," that is
"navigable waters," for purposes of regulating the discharge of
dredged or fill material pursuant to section 404(a) of the Clean Water
Act,' deals exclusively with the Corps' jurisdiction under that Act.

98. Id. at 172-73.
99. See supra note 73.
100. See supra note 86.
101. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
103. Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding
occasional surface flow at times of heavy rainfall enough to be navigable); United
States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding stream located
entirely in one county navigable when it is not navigable in fact and transports no
goods).
104. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Couny v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct.
675, 684 (2001).
105. Id. at 678 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (3) (1999)).
106. Id. at 684.
107. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
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Therefore, the Corps' definition has no applicability in determining
public access to water bodies.
E. NAVIGABILITY FOR TITLE UNDER THE EQUAL FOOTING DOcTRINE

As new states joined the Union, each received title to the lands
underlying navigable waters under the Equal Footing Doctrine.' 8 The
Federal Government held such lands in trust for the future states, to
be granted to each new state upon admission to the Union on an
"equal footing" with the other states.'
The law is settled that lands
underlying navigable waters within each state belong to the state as
sovereign, and the state can use and dispose of them as it sees fit,
subject to Congress's paramount power to control the waters for
navigation and commerce."0 Consequently, if any streams in Colorado
meet the test of navigability for purposes of title, the state owns the
underlying land and the public would have access to the stream for
floating and other purposes subject to whatever regulations the state
imposes.
Whether a stream is navigable for the purpose of determining title
to the bed is a federal question."' In United States v. Holt State Bank, the
Supreme Court summarized the federal rule for determining whether
a body of water is navigable for title purposes.
The rule long since approved by this Court in applying the
Constitution and laws of the United States is that streams or lakes
which are navigable in fact must be regarded as navigable in law; that
they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of
being used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in
the customary modes of trade and travel on water; and further that
navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which such
use is or may be had-whether by steamboats, sailing vessels or
flatboats-nor on an absence of occasional difficulties in navigation,
but on the fact, if it be a fact, that the stream in its natural and
ordinary condition affords a channel for useful commerce."'

Note that the test of navigability for title purposes is The Daniel Ball
"navigability in fact" definition. However, the type of commerce
required to meet the navigability for title test is intrastate commerce. '
To determine navigability for title, the Court limits the finding of
navigability to the date of "admission of a State to the Union.""4 Also,
the test for navigability of a waterbody is not limited to evidence of
actual commerce, but to evidence of the susceptibility of useful

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981).
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54 (1926).
Id. at 55-56.
Id.at 56.
See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971).
United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
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commerce.
The question of that susceptibility in the ordinary condition
of the rivers, rather than of the mere manner or extent of actual use,
is the crucial question.... The extent of existing commerce is not
the test. The evidence of the actual use of streams, and especially of
extensive and continued use for commercial purposes, may be most
persuasive, but where conditions of exploration and settlement
explain the infrequency or limited nature of such use, the
susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be
satisfactorily proved.

Thus, in deciding questions of navigability for title, the Supreme
Court limits the evaluation of navigability to (1) the time the state in
which the water is located was admitted to the Union, and (2) finding
the body of water was susceptible for useful commerce conducted in
customary modes of trade and travel. In doing so, the Court implicitly
requires that evidence of navigability be limited to both the type of
commerce and the type of watercraft that existed when the state was
admitted to the Union. In Utah v. United States, the Supreme Court
determined the Great Salt Lake was navigable since the Special Master
found the "Lake was physically capable of being used in its ordinary
condition as a highway for floating and affording passage to water craft
in the manner over which trade and travel was or might be conducted
in the customary modes of travel on water at that time." 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a case
determining the navigability of the Gulkana River in Alaska, appears to
have expanded the limitation of useful commerce by allowing
recreational watercraft involved in the rafting industry to evidence
useful commerce." 7 The court noted, however, that both parties
agreed the principal uses of the Gulkana had always been recreational,
and evidence of "watercraft customary for the River's use at statehood
included powered boats with a load capacity of approximately 1,000
lbs."1
Considering this evidence, the court reasoned that "the
watercraft customary at statehood could have at least supported
commercial activity of the type carried on today, with minor
modifications due to a more limited load capacity and rudimentary
technology."" 9 Therefore, even though the court considered evidence
of commercial rafting in a navigability for title analysis, the type of
activity from which the commerce was derived both existed and was
supportable by the type of watercraft used on the Gulkana at the time
Alaska became a state in 1959. Such is probably not the case in
Colorado. It is very unlikely that any commercial recreational rafting
occurred in Colorado in 1876, when Colorado achieved statehood.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931).
Id. at 12.
Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id.
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Another factor distinguishing the Gulkana River from the streams
flowing through private property in Colorado is that the Gulkana
flowed through federal public land. 20 The Gulkana River dispute
involved neither private parties nor private property. In contrast, if
courts were to relate back to 1876 the present day use of Colorado's
streams for recreational floating, and hold these streams navigable for
title purposes, the relation back would effectively divest riparian
property owners of property they and their predecessors have
possessed, used productively, and paid taxes on since the land was
settled and patented in the good faith belief they owned the beds of
the streams. Furthermore, such action would trivialize the whole
concept of navigability for title because many of the streams in
Colorado would qualify if present use for recreational boating could
be related back to 1876.
A widely held belief is that a stream's ability to float a log makes the
stream navigable. However, the United States Supreme Court, in
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co. held logs, poles, and
rafts that floated during high water insufficient evidence of
navigability. 2' The Court applied The Daniel Ball navigability in fact
test, adding,
[i] tis not, however,... "every small creek in which a fishing skiff or
gunning canoe can be made to float at high water which is deemed
navigable, but, in order to give it the character of a navigable stream,

it must be generally
and commonly useful to some purpose of trade
22
or agriculture.'

To further place the standard for navigability for title purposes in a
local perspective, the Supreme Court has held some parts of the
Colorado and Green Rivers in Utah navigable for title purposes and
other parts of both rivers not navigable.' 2 - In determining whether a
useful channel for commerce existed, the Court considered evidence
of actual use, as well as the magnitude and timing of discharge (flow),
depth, gradient, rapids, and other obstacles to navigation. 24 The
reaches declared 125not navigable were those containing high and
dangerous rapids.
The Colorado Supreme Court has held no navigable streams exist
in Colorado. 126 Those cases, however, did not apply the navigability for
120. This distinction is apparent from the facts. The district court set aside the
conveyance from the United States to an Alaska native corporation. Id. at 1403.
121. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co. 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899)
(finding the Rio Grande not navigable throughout its course in New Mexico).
122. Id. at 698-99 (quoting The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 442 (1874)).
123. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1931).
124. Id.
at 77-81.
125. Id.at 80.
126. In re German Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo. 1914) ("The natural
streams of the state are nonnavigable within its limits."); Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P.
220, 222 (Colo. 1912) ("[Tlhe natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable
within its territorial limits."), overruled on other grounds by United States v. City & County
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title test proscribed by the United States Supreme Court in Holt State
Bank, or any other test for that matter.2 7 Other Colorado cases note in
passing that certain rivers are not navigable. 2 The United States
Supreme Court has also made such observations in passing.'2 Because
navigability of streams is a matter of general knowledge, courts can
and do take judicial notice of navigability or non-navigability of
streams in their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, Stockman v. Leddy
and In re German Ditch & Reservoir Co. probably reflect the state of
general knowledge in Colorado in 1912 and 1914, respectively. At the
very least, they indicate that Colorado has not elected to adopt its own
definition of navigability. Furthermore, the Colorado Supreme Court
and other Colorado courts believe Colorado's topography does not
lend itself to rivers that are navigable in fact. While state ownership of
the bed of any stream in Colorado cannot be ruled out, such
ownership would have to be proven by specific facts on a case by case
basis, with each determination of navigability standing on its own
facts. 3 ' In any event, the State has not established title to the bed of
any Colorado stream at this time.
To summarize, with the possible exception of the Colorado River
downstream of Grand Junction to the Utah state line, there are no
navigable streams in Colorado under any definition that would allow
the public access to those reaches flowing through private lands. A
century and a quarter after statehood, Colorado has not adopted its
own definition of navigability for any purpose. Emmert is still the law of
Colorado. Nor is there any basis for a right to float through private
lands under federal law, with the possible exception of the reach of the
Colorado River discussed above. No reported court decisions have
applied any of the federal tests for navigability to any stream in
Colorado.

of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 16-17 (Colo. 1982) and Denver Ass'n for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200, 204 (Colo. 1975).
127. See ln re German Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. at 6-10; Stockman, 129 P. at 222.
128. United States v. Dist. Court In & For the County of Eagle, 458 P.2d 760, 762
(Colo. 1969) (Eagle River); Hall v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., 405 P.2d 749, 750
(Colo. 1965) (South Platte River); Smith v. Town of Fowler, 333 P.2d 1034, 1036
(Colo. 1959) (Arkansas River); Platte Water Co. v. N. Colo. Irrigation Co., 21 P. 711,
713 (Colo. 1889) (South Platte River).
129. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 585 (1922) (passing reference to
"Platte and other large western streams known to be unnavigable").
130. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 633 n.9 (1970) (referring
to district court's taking of judicial notice of relevant reaches of the Arkansas River);
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899)
(discussing limitations on the ability of courts to take judicial notice of navigability of
streams within their jurisdiction).
131. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 87 (1931); United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 403 (1940). These cases indicate that a court decision is
necessary, contrary to the position taken by at least one proponent of a general
unlimited right to float.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In 1979, the Colorado Supreme Court in Emmert reconfirmed that
the beds of streams flowing through private property in Colorado are
privately owned, and held that the public has no right to the use of
waters overlying private lands for recreational purposes without the
consent of the owner. Just prior to Emmert, the General Assembly had
defined "premises" for purposes of the criminal trespass statutes to
exclude the water overlying private lands. Then, in 1983, Attorney
General Woodard correctly opined that it is not a crime to float
through private property if the floater does not touch the bottom.
However, in that same opinion, Woodard confused the floating public
and property owners in stating that, in amending the criminal trespass
statute, the General Assembly had not authorized property owners to
prevent floating through their property. Woodard simply ignored the
constitutional right of a property owner to exclude others, which exists
independent of any legislative act. Nothing has happened since
Emmert to establish any right for the public to float through privately
owned lands. No reported court decisions declare any Colorado
stream navigable for title purposes, or for any other purpose. No
statute authorizes floating through private property. Floating through
private property remains a civil trespass and riparian landowners still
have civil remedies for trespass available to them.
The increasing popularity of floating with its attendant economic
benefits to boaters and the resulting impacts on private property rights
will inevitably compel the General Assembly to address the issue. In
doing so, the General Assembly must recognize the constitutional
limitations inherent in granting access to private property. If the
General Assembly is to enact a law opening streams flowing through
private lands to public use, it must provide for, and be prepared to
pay, just compensation.
Alternatively, and with far less cost to
taxpayers, it could provide incentives for obtaining voluntary
easements or licenses from the landowners. As Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes said: "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire bya shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change."

132. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (Holmes, J.).

